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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1990). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to give a 
cautionary jury instruction concerning the reliability of 
eyewitness identification? 
Where defendant did not request a cautionary eyewitness 
identification jury instruction and registered no objection to the 
instructions given by the court, he has failed to preserve any 
objection and cannot now raise the issue for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1987); Utah R. 
Crim. P. 19(c) (1992). 
2. Did the trial court properly allow defendant and a 
defense witness to be cross-examined as to the existence of prior 
felony convictions? 
"Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question 
of law, and we always review questions of law under a correctness 
standard. • . . [I]n deciding whether the trial court erred as a 
matter of law, we de facto grant it some discretion, because we 
reverse only if we conclude that it acted unreasonably. . . . If we 
conclude that the trial court erred, we may characterize that 
ruling as "an abuse of discretion," but in reality, we have found 
that the court committed legal error. . .." State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Evidence 609(a) (1992), governing 
impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime, provides: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted if elicited from him or 
established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of the punishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 6, 1992, defendant was tried before a jury 
and convicted of burglary, a second degree felony. On February 25, 
1992, the trial court sentenced defendant to 1 to 15 years in the 
2 
Utah State Prison, levied a fine of $1250, and suspended the prison 
term upon successful completion of a 36-month probation period (R. 
109-11 or addendum A). Defendant timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In Levan, Utah, on the evening of December 2, 1989, Pam 
Jackman was unloading groceries from her car when she heard the 
sound of breaking glass. She looked across the street and saw feet 
going in through the front window of her recently deceased 
neighbor's uninhabited home (T. 71). She called her husband, who 
came outside while she went inside momentarily to call the police. 
She then joined her husband outside (T. 71-2, 102-03). 
A few minutes later, when two people emerged through the 
window, Brent Jackman yelled at them, and they "came walking over 
toward meM (T. 103). One stayed out by the road, while the other 
approached Mr. Jackman, who was standing on his porch. The man 
told Mr. Jackman he was looking for "quite a large sum of money" 
that was supposed to have been in the home (T. 104). The 
conversation ended after a minute or two, and the man returned to 
his companion by the road. They coth walked down the road past a 
school bus that blocked them from the Jackmans1 view. Both Mr. and 
Mrs. Jackman testified that they saw red brake-type lights come on, 
heard doors close, and saw a big, brown car with three people in it 
drive by their house, under a street light, and turn left (T. 75, 
77, 106). 
Mrs. Jackman told the responding officer that one of the 
people in the car was wearing a sheepskin coat (T. 122). Another 
3 
officer assisting in the investigation testified: "Two things that 
[Mrs. Jackman] was sure of was that she could remake [sic] this 
particular vehicle if she had seen it again and that the individual 
driving was wearing a sheepskin jacket" (T. 151). Mrs. Jackman 
testified at trial that the driver was also wearing a "dark colored 
cowboy hat" (T. 75). 
The following morning, Mrs. Jackman noticed a car driving 
very slowly down her street and recognized it as the same vehicle 
she had seen the evening before, but with four occupants (T. 78-
79). She got in her van, followed the vehicle, recorded the 
license plate number, returned home, and telephoned the Sheriff's 
Department (T. 79-80). 
The police stopped the vehicle, which was registered to 
defendant's son. Defendant, the driver, was arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol and for burglary (T. 132). He was 
wearing a black cowboy hat at the time of his arrest, and later, 
when the vehicle was being inventoried, he asked officers if he 
could retrieve his sheepskin coat from the car (T. 130). Two other 
people in the car were also arrested and charged with burglary. 
At trial, Pam Jackman's testimony focused on the 
similarities in clothing and body type of the man she had seen 
driving the car the evening of the burglary and the next morning. 
She volunteered that she "couldn't really see" his face (T. 75-76). 
Brent Jackman's testimony focused on the description of the 
vehicle. He stated that he "was concentrating on the vehicle" and 
"didn't really look at the people in the car at all" (T. 115). 
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Other evidence was introduced at trial to show that the 
vehicle's tire tracks matched tracks found at the site of the 
burglary, that a cigarette butt found in the burglarized home 
matched items of the same brand found in the car, and that boot 
prints found at the site matched those of the other two passengers 
who were arrested with defendant (T. 130, 133-35). 
The defense put on three alibi witnesses, in addition to 
defendant, all of whom testified that defendant was in Provo 
playing cards at the home of a friend at the time of the burglary. 
Defendant further testified that he drove his truck home late in 
the evening (T. 176) and then left again around midnight in his 
son's car with the two other men who were found with him the next 
day1 (T. 169). The three of them drove to St. George to pick up 
defendant's brother. On the way home, the group stopped in Levan 
and drove slowly through the town, trying to locate a truck 
defendant's son had purchased from him (T. 171). As they were 
leaving town, the police stopped them. 
SUMMARY C? ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the trial court should have 
given a cautionary instruction to the jury, warning of the 
fallibility of eyewitness testimony. In order for an eyewitness 
instruction to be mandatory, however, the identification must be a 
central issue in the case, and the defense must request the 
1
 Defendant testified that the men were acquaintances who 
showed up at his home around midnight looking for a place to sleep. 
Defendant's girlfriend didn't want them to stay if defendant was 
leaving, so defendant took them along to St. George (T. 167-68). 
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instruction. State v. Long, 721 P. 2d 483 (Utah 1986). Here, 
defendant failed to propose such an instruction for the court's 
consideration (R. 58-70) and failed to object to the instructions 
that the court gave (T. 229-30 or addendum B). Defendant, 
therefore, has waived consideration of the issue for the first time 
on appeal. 
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in 
allowing defendant cind one of defendant's witnesses to be cross-
examined as to the existence and nature of prior felony 
convictions. Defendant asserts that this information was 
irrelevant and that it "made these individuals look unreliable in 
the eyes of the jurors" (Br. of Appellant at 6). While, indeed, 
the information may have discredited defendant and his witness, the 
testimony was properly admitted pursuant to rule 609(a)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT REQUEST THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT GIVE AN EYEWITNESS JURY 
INSTRUCTION AND DID NOT OBJECT TO THE 
INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE GIVEN, HE HAS WAIVED 
CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL. 
Cautionary jury instructions on eyewitness testimony are 
required in Utah "whenever eyewitness identification is a central 
issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the 
defense." State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986). In this 
case, defendant failed to request the instruction. His proposed 
jury instructions do not even peripherally raise the issue of 
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eyewitness identification (R. 58-70). In addition, the court asked 
counsel three times if there were any objections to the jury 
instructions, and defense counsel responded consistently that there 
were not (T. 229-30 or addendum B). Under such circumstances, 
defendant has waived consideration of the issue on appeal. State 
v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 504. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT AND A DEFENSE WITNESS 
CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF PRIOR 
FELONY CONVICTIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 
609(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
Evidence of prior convictions may be used to impeach a 
testifying defendant's credibility as a witness as well as the 
credibility of a witness other than the defendant. State v. 
Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1990). To be admissible under 
this rule, the prior conviction must fit into one of two 
categories: 
1) it is "punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one year under the law under 
which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant1' or; 
2) it involves "dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment." 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a). To ensure that the information solicited 
under rule 609(a) is used only for impeachment purposes and that 
defendant is not convicted of past, rather than present, crimes, 
the inquiry into prior convictions is limited to "the nature of the 
crime, the date of the conviction and the punishment." State v. 
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Tucker, 800 P.2d at 822. 
In this case, only the first category of conviction is 
involved. Both defendant and his witness, Poncho Valdez, were 
asked on cross-examination if they had ever been convicted of a 
felony. Defendant admitted to two burglaries, and the prosecution 
asked no follow-up questions (T. 174). Mr. Valdez admitted to "a 
couple" of felonies, specifically theft of copper wire. In 
response to the prosecutor's follow-up question, "Any burglaries?", 
he responded, "When I was a juvenile, yes" (T. 197). The 
prosecutor then went on to other matters. 
Defendant argues that this testimony was prejudicial and 
should not have been admitted.2 To flesh out defendant's 
unarticulated argument, he seems to be asserting that the trial 
court erred as a matter of law in permitting the testimony because 
the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the resulting 
prejudice to defendant. Defendant has not asserted that the trial 
court failed to engage in the balancing required by rule 609(a) nor 
has he described the prejudicial effect beyond the bare assertion 
that it "made these individuals look unreliable in the eyes of the 
jurors" (Br. of Appellant at 6).3 
2
 Defendant also asserts on appeal that the testimony was 
irrelevant. Because he did not raise this ground in the trial 
court (R. 230 or addendum B), he has waived it before this Court. 
State v. Belqard, 811 P.2d 211, 213-214 (Utah App. 1991). 
3
 Defendant is, of course, correct in this assertion. Rule 
609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is captioned "Impeachment by 
evidence of conviction of crime," and its first subsection begins 
with the words, "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness. . .." Plainly, one of the purposes of cross-examination 
is to call into question the credibility of witnesses, especially 
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In reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court applies 
a correctness standard, but vests some discretion in the trial 
court. This Court will reverse only if it concludes that the trial 
court "acted unreasonably in striking the balance [between 
probativeness and prejudice]." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, the record indicates that, in the course of the 
trial, the court held an off-the-record bench conference 
specifically to discuss the admissibility of defendant's and Mr. 
Valdez's prior convictions (T. 230-31 or addendum B). On the 
record, at the end of the trial, the court reviewed the scope of 
the questioning it had authorized, which clearly fell within the 
narrow limits set by State v. Tucker. Although the court did not 
articulate its probative value/prejudicial effect determination on 
the record, an appellate court "upholds the trial court even if it 
failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be 
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 (Utah 1991). Here, where a 
bench conference was held for the specific purpose of discussing 
the admissibility of prior convictions, it is reasonable to assume 
that the court found that, based on the evidence before it, the 
probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice to 
defendant. 
In order to overturn a trial court's findings, it is the 
appellant's responsibility to marshall all of the evidence and 
where the defense relies on an alibi theory. 
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"then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings of fact." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 
199-200 (Utah 1991). Where, as in this case, defendant has failed 
wholly to marshall the evidence in support of the facts, this Court 
leaves the facts undisturbed. State v. Chavez, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 
52, 53 (Utah November 3, 1992). Absent any record support for 
defendant's bald contention that the court's ruling was incorrect, 
there is simply no indication that the court acted unreasonably. 
Its ruling, therefore, should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant did not request a cautionary eyewitness 
identification jury instruction and did not object to th€> 
instructions as given. He has, therefore, waived consideration of 
the issue on appeal. 
The trial court properly allowed cross-examination of 
defendant and one of his alibi witnesses concerning their prior 
felony convictions, in compliance with the requirements of rule* 
609(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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For these reasons, defendant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this [0_ day of December, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Milton T. Harmon, Attorney for Appellant, P.O. Box 97, Nephi, Utah 
84648, this /fl^day of December, 1992. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
* p H c! Dktrict Court, Ju«i> c ^ r y 
F I L E D 
i .... 0 J . . . J 
Pat P. Greenwood.Cierk _ Deputy 
Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 623*1141 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
vs. : 
Criminal No. 273-D 
FRANKLIN L. POWELL, : 
Defendant. : 
An Information having been filed herein charging the 
defendant, Franklin L. Powell, with the commission of the second 
degree felony of Burglary. 
The defendant having been convicted of said charge at a trial 
held February 6, 1992. 
The case was referred to the Utah State Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole for a pre-sentence report. The defendant and 
his attorney, Milton T. Harmon, appeared on February 25, 1992 for 
the pronouncement of Judgment and Sentencing. 
No legal reason having been shown why Judgment should not be 
pronounced, it is the Judgment of the Court as follows: 
1 
The defendant is guilty of the second degree felony of 
burglary and is sentenced to serve not less than one nor more than 
15 years in the Utsth State Prison and to pay a fine of $1,000.00 
and pay $250.00 to the Victim's Reparation Fund. 
Imposition of the prison sentence is suspended upon successful 
completion of a thirty-six month probation upon the following 
conditions: 
1. The defendant enter into an agreement with the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole and comply strictly with 
its terms and conditions. 
2. The defendant report to the Department and to the Court 
whenever required. 
3. The defendant violate no law either federal, state or 
municipal. 
4. The defendant serve six months in the Juab County jail 
with credit given for the time already served. 
5. The defendant pay the fine of $1,000.00 or complete 200 
hours of Alternative Community Service and pay $250.00 to the 
Victim's Reparation Fund. 
6. The defendant be required to participate in counseling or 
2 
no 
therapy as outlined by his probation officer. 
Dated this *2 day of *^<^l*^/l , 1992, 
fl Distrifct Judger z? 
3 
ADDENDUM B 
229 
consulted the requests made by the attorneys and 
has granted some-- granted the substance of some. 
And I think I only denied one, and that was one 
that was cumulative and more of an argument 
relative to the manner in which they should 
proceed in their deliberations in one instance; 
and the other was one of the instructions on the 
evidence being-- the two classes of evidence 
circumstantial and--
There's one on that-- yours, that I didn't 
give. 
MR. HARMON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are either of you taking 
exception to any of the instructions the Court 
gives? 
MR* EYRE: The State takes no 
exceptions. 
MR* HARMON; The defendant takes no 
exceptions. 
THE COURT: Do you have any objections--
or do you have any objections to the Court not 
having given any of those that either of you have 
requested? 
MR. EYRE: The State has no objections. 
MR. HARMON: None for the defendant. 
Lesley Nelson, C.S.R. 
784 East Skylark Drive 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (8(m 7QA-OQ*Q 
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THE COURT: So there are no exceptions 
to note on the record on the jury instructions? 
MR. HARMON: No. 
THE COURT: I guess we can get the jury 
instructed and you can go ahead with your final 
arguments• 
MR. HARMON: Your Honor# perhaps we 
ought to put on the record now that during the 
course of the trial we had a conference at the 
bench regarding the State putting on the records 
of two of the witnesses-- or the defendant and one 
of the witness's-- the criminal record. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. HARMON: And we object to that. We 
think that that was prejudicial. 
And the Court indicated that that would be 
allowed and--
THE COURT: What the Court allowed was 
questioning the witness himself, if he had been 
convicted of a felony and to answer one follow 
through: What kind? In two cases-- one was the 
defendant himself and also Valdez-- both responded 
affirmatively on those issues. And you're 
correct. The Court did agree that Mr. Eyre could 
do that. 
Lesley Nelson, C.S.R. 
784 East Skylark Drive 
••--u QAcac\ fftoil 798-2868 
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Does that refresh your memory? 
MR, EYRE: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
MR. HARMON: That's all. 
THE COURT: Okay. We better get out and 
get at it. 
(Whereupon, at 3:30 P.M. the chamber 
conference was concluded.) 
(Whereupon, at 3:50 P.M. the jury returned 
to the courtroom and the following 
proceedings were continued:) 
THE COURT: The record will show the 
jurors are all present in the jury box ready to 
proceed• 
And the Court is also prepared to instruct 
you, ladies and gentlemen, on the law that applies 
to this case at this time; afterwhich, we will 
turn the time over to the attorneys and they'll 
present their closing arguments. 
The instructions will be oral, and you will 
be able to take the written instructions into the 
jury room for any further reference you may have 
to them. 
(Whereupon, the jury was instructed by the 
Court.) 
Lesley Nelson, C.S.R. 
784 East Skylark Drive 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (801) 798-2868 
